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Hospital care is the most prominent of several important service industries – concentrated 
heavily in health care, education, and the arts – in which nonprofit firms account for a substantial 
share of total production.  Nonprofit firms do not, however, provide all of the nation’s hospital 
care; the industry is also heavily populated with both for-profit and governmental firms.  The 
mix of ownership forms in this industry has fed a long-standing debate among economists, 
sociologists, and legal scholars about the patient and social welfare implications of ownership, 
with particular attention to differences between nonprofit and for-profit institutions.  In this vein, 
several studies (reviewed in Kessler and McClellan 2002) have examined the effects of 
ownership on quality of care, operating efficiency, prices, costs, and the volume of charity care.  
We explore here a different but related issue:  the effects of ownership on the rapidity of exit in 
the face of declining demand.   
In recent years, hospital care in the U.S. has been characterized by rapidly falling 
demand, likely due in large part to technological advances in medical procedures and to managed 
care (Cutler 2000).  Between 1980 and 1999, inpatient non-federal days in short-stay hospitals in 
the U.S. fell from 293,830,162 to 160,560,460, or 45.4 percent (Health United States 2001, 
Tables 1 and 91).  Capacity, however, has declined significantly less rapidly.  The number of 
non-federal hospital beds fell from 1,247,188 to 938,746 over this period, or 24.7 percent (Health 
United States 2001, Table 108).   
The preponderance of the nonprofit form in the hospital industry may largely explain this 
divergence between the rate of decline in demand and the rate of contraction of capacity.  The 
managers of nonprofit hospitals, lacking a class of owners to whom they are accountable, face no  
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external pressure to maximize profits, or even (like a public utility) to produce at least a market 
rate of return on the firm’s invested capital.  Rather, when cash flow is positive, they are free to 
reinvest all of it, expanding capacity to the point where net revenues (and hence the marginal rate 
of return on existing investments) is zero.  And, even if cash flow is negative, they are free to 
maintain capacity by drawing down on accumulated net assets (which, among nonprofit 
hospitals, are often substantial).  Indeed, managers of nonprofit hospitals may even feel it is their 
duty to behave in this fashion, believing in good faith that all of the firm’s revenues and net 
assets must be dedicated to providing the maximum amount of hospital care possible. 
A natural and potentially more efficient alternative would be for the hospital to return its 
(potential) free cash flow, beyond what can be reinvested with an appropriately high social rate 
of return, to patients in the form of lower prices.  But for hospital managers this alternative is 
rendered even less morally salient than it might otherwise be by the fact that the bulk of hospital 
revenue today comes, not directly from patients, but rather from third-party insurers.  (Another 
alternative would be to donate net revenues or assets to other charities with greater social need, 
as is sometimes done with the proceeds from conversion from nonprofit to for-profit form.)  
Reluctance to reduce capacity is likely to be strongly reinforced, moreover, by pressure from a 
hospital’s affiliated staff physicians, whose income may be threatened by reduction or 
elimination of the hospitals’ facilities (Pauly and Redish 1974). 
  To be sure, the managers of for-profit firms, and particularly of broadly-held business 
corporations, also have at times both the incentive and the opportunity to engage in empire-
building.  But the market for corporate control acts as an ultimate check on such tendencies, as 
demonstrated by the numerous hostile takeovers of the 1980s, which were in part directed at  
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reducing overcapacity and excessive reinvestment (Jensen 1988).  No similar check exists for 
nonprofit firms, which cannot be the subject of a hostile takeover. 
  It follows that a nonprofit firm not only can, but might well be expected to, maintain 
capacity and even expand in circumstances where its for-profit competitors choose to contract or 
exit the market entirely.  And this can remain true even if for-profit firms are significantly more 
cost efficient, and even if the nonprofit firm receives no special subsidies (Hansmann, 1996a).  In 
short, nonprofit firms have a tendency to act as capital traps, in which capital remains 
inefficiently embedded over long periods. 
The social welfare implications of such behavior are theoretically indeterminate.  On one 
hand, “slow” adjustment of capacity to demand may be optimal.  Altering the level of a factor of 
production whose costs are as sunk as those of a hospital bed is socially costly.  On the other 
hand, “slow” adjustment may be socially wasteful.  Maintaining a hospital bed is costly, in both 
financial and nonfinancial terms. Substantial research, starting with Roemer (1961), has 
suggested that high levels of bed capacity per patient lead to longer lengths of stay and higher 
costs.  More recent research indicates that hospitals that treat relatively few cases of any 
particular type of patient – a potential consequence of high capacity – may deliver lower-quality 
care.  Kessler and McClellan (2000), for example, find that elderly heart attack patients from 
markets with high levels of capacity per unit cardiac patient experience both generally higher 
levels of Medicare expenditures and higher mortality rates (although somewhat lower rates of 
cardiac complications).   
Thus, it is important to understand how ownership affects capacity choice.  If ownership 
forms respond differently to changes in demand, then public policies that favor one ownership  
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form over another may affect welfare not just by altering the mix of ownership forms itself, but 
also by affecting the aggregate level of industry capacity.  Moreover, identifying differences in 
the response of capacity to demand by ownership type can help distinguish among competing 
general models of nonprofit firm behavior. 
Despite the importance of the subject, however, little empirical work has focused on the 
impact of ownership form on capacity choice.  Two studies have examined the differential 
supply response of nonprofit and for-profit firms, and of hospitals in particular, to rapid increases 
in demand.  Both studies found that the market share of for-profit as opposed to nonprofit firms 
was significantly higher in areas that had recently experienced rapid growth in population.  
(Steinwald and Neuhauser 1970; Hansmann 1987.)   These studies concluded that this pattern is 
explained, in important part, by the difficulties that nonprofit firms face in obtaining rapid access 
to capital.
1  The long-term pattern of development in the hospital industry, prior to the 
implementation of Medicare and Medicaid in 1966, was that the ratio of for-profit to nonprofit 
firms increased during periods of rapidly increasing demand, and then fell -- owing, in part, to 
conversions from for-profit to nonprofit form -- as demand growth slackened (Steinwald and 
Neuhauser 1970).  The sluggish nonprofit supply response to increasing demand was thus largely 
a short-term phenomenon. 
The principal problem facing the hospital industry today, however, may not be to hasten 
capacity expansion to meet growing demand, but just the opposite:  to hasten the elimination of 
excess capacity already in place.  Moreover, the problem is not peculiar to the hospital industry.  
The nonprofit form frequently performs a transitional role in the early stages of a service 
industry’s development, serving as an important source of production until adequate demand- 
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side financing is organized, and the service is sufficiently standardized or regulated, to permit 
for-profit firms to serve as efficient providers.  After that, the nonprofit firms lose their special 
raison d’etre, yet retain a substantial market share owing to trapped capital.  Savings banking is a 
conspicuous example from the past (Hansmann, 1996b); health insurance and health 
maintenance organizations are contemporary examples; and higher education may be an example 
in the future (Hansmann 1996a).  The problem of trapped capital is generic in the nonprofit 
sector. 
  We have spoken so far of the effects of nonprofit versus for-profit ownership on the rate 
of capacity adjustment, but the underlying model of behavior described above can explain other 
differences in capacity choice between ownership forms. Hospital care, like some other 
important services such as education, is also provided in substantial part by governmental 
institutions.  Supply response in general, and trapped capital in particular, may be less of a 
problem for these public firms than it is for nonprofit firms.  A public hospital is not a nonprofit 
entity, but rather a proprietary entity, with the government as the owner.  And the government 
has other pressing uses for its funds besides providing hospital care.  Consequently, when the 
private sector becomes capable of providing services formerly provided by the government, 
governments may face political incentives to exit.  Consistent with this logic, after Medicare and 
Medicaid relieved much of the need for public and nonprofit hospitals to provide uncompensated 
care, there was substantial exit by public institutions, whose share of total beds dropped from 
roughly 31% to 24% between 1971 and 1992, while for-profit hospitals simultaneously increased 
their market share from 6% to 12%.  In striking comparison, nonprofit hospitals, rather than 
                                                                                                                                              
1 See Lakdawalla and Philipson (1998) for related work on other constraints on nonprofits’ ability to expand.  
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exiting in large numbers like the public institutions, actually increased their market share slightly 
during that period, from 63% to 64%.  (Hansmann 1996a.) 
  For similar reasons, one might expect nonprofit hospitals to differ among themselves in 
terms of supply response.  The most conspicuous divide in this respect is between religiously-
affiliated and nonreligious hospitals.  Like public hospitals, religiously-affiliated hospitals often 
have an owner of sorts, if not in the formal legal sense then at least in the functional sense that 
they are commonly associated with another entity, the church, that both exercises substantial 
control over them and stands to benefit from economies achieved in the hospitals’ operations 
(and can serve as a source of funds and act as entrepreneur when expansion or entry is called 
for).  By this reasoning, religiously-affiliated hospitals would show greater supply response than 
non-religious nonprofit hospitals. 
  In this paper we seek to test whether rates of exit from the hospital industry differ 
significantly across the different forms of ownership, and especially whether secular nonprofit 
hospitals, which supply the majority of industry capacity, are much slower to reduce capacity 
than are other types of hospitals.  We examine the relative responsiveness of the different types 
of hospitals to changes in demand for hospital services, using changes in the size of the elderly 
population as a proxy for changes in demand.  We present estimates of the effect of population 
changes at the zip-code level between 1985 and 1994 on changes in the capacity of for-profit, 
secular nonprofit, religious nonprofit, and public hospitals over the same period, holding 
constant metropolitan statistical area (MSA) fixed effects and other 1985 baseline characteristics 
of residential zip codes.  We decompose the effect on each ownership form’s capacity of 
population into four mutually exclusive and exhaustive sources:  changes due to opens and closes  
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of hospitals, changes due to conversions, changes due to mergers and spinoffs, and changes due 
to changes in hospitals’ bed size.  We also investigate whether the responsiveness of different 
ownership forms’ capacity to population differ according to zip codes’ baseline 1985 hospital 
market characteristics. 
Sections II through IV present the statistical models, the sources of data, and the 
empirical results.  Section V concludes with some observations about the implications of our 
results for the hypothesized model of nonprofit firms’ behavior described above, and for 
economic efficiency in sectors dominated by nonprofit firms. 
 
II. MODELS 
For every residential zip code z = 1, …, Z in a MSA in 1985 and 1994, we construct a 
measure of the hospital capacity serving that zip code.  We assume that z is served by every 
nonfederal, general medical /surgical hospital j = 1, …, Jz within 35 miles of the patient’s 
residence with at least five heart attack (AMI) admissions, and every large, nonfederal, general 
medical/surgical teaching hospital within 100 miles of the patient’s residence with at least five 
AMI admissions.
2 We allocate a hospital’s beds Bj to z in inverse proportion to the distance 

























                                            
2 We explain the reason for these a priori constraints in Kessler and McClellan (2000); because markets for cardiac 
care are generally much smaller than the constraints, they are not restrictive.  
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where Djz is the distance from j to z for every z = 1, …, Zj that is served by j.   We define   Cz,94 
analogously, and the log growth of capacity in zip code z as dlnCz = ln(Cz,94) – ln(Cz,85).  The 








assures that for any hospital, the sum across the zip codes that it serves of the weights allocating 
its capacity equals 1, i.e. 





















We decompose capacity in two ways to explore whether market conditions and changes 
in demand for hospital services have different effects on the capacity provided by hospitals of 
different ownership types.  First, we decompose each residential area’s capacity by its form of 


























where SNPj = 1 if j is a secular nonprofit hospital.  We define for-profit capacity Cz,85
FP, religious 
nonprofit capacity Cz,85
RNP, and public capacity Cz,85
P (and their associated growth rates) 
analogously.  Estimates of the effect of market conditions and changes in demand on each 
ownership form’s capacity will show how different types of organizations respond to exogenous 
shocks.  
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  Second, we decompose each area’s change in capacity by the source of the change.  We 
categorize changes in total capacity and changes in each ownership form’s capacity as due to one 
or more of four exhaustive and mutually exclusive causes:  opens and closes of new hospitals; 
conversions (i.e., changes in ownership status); mergers and demergers; and changes in bed size 
for hospitals not experiencing any of the three changes above.  We construct an area’s 
(counterfactual) change in capacity due to (for example) opens and closes as follows.  Define 
each hospital’s 1985 capacity Bj,85 as its actual 1985 capacity; define each hospital’s 1994 
capacity Bj,94 =  Bj,85, unless the hospital opened or closed, in which case define Bj,94 =  Bj,94.  
Then, recalculate each area’s capacity and change in capacity using these counterfactual hospital 
capacities.  
  We model area changes in capacity as a function of 1985-1994 changes in a zip code’s 
Medicare enrollee population (to proxy for changes in demand for hospital services), the 1985 
demographic characteristics of each zip code, the 1985 hospital market characteristics of each zip 
code, and MSA fixed effects.  Thus, our effects are identified from within-MSA changes in 
population and within-MSA differences in market characteristics. We allow hospital capacity to 
respond asymmetrically to population increases and decreases.  Our basic models specify the log 
change in residential zip code z’s capacity of ownership form k as a linear function of these 
factors:   
(1)    dlnCz
k = α k + β
+dlnPz
+
  + β
-dlnPz
-
  + Xzφ  + Mzγ  + ε z, 
where α k is an MSA-specific constant term; dlnPz
+
  is z’s log change in population if z’s 
population expanded, 0 otherwise; dlnPz
-
  is z’s log change in population if z’s population 
contracted, 0 otherwise; Xz is a vector of six variables denoting the proportion of  z’s population  
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in 1985 who were female, black, age 70-74, age 75-79, age 80-89, and age 90-99 (omitted group 
is the proportion of population that were white males aged 65-69); Mz is a vector of six variables 
denoting whether z in 1985 was in a highly-concentrated hospital market (in the top quartile of 
the distribution of Hirschman-Herfindahl indices), and whether z in 1985 had above the median 
density of patients admitted to large hospitals, teaching hospitals, hospitals that were members of 
multi-hospital systems, for-profit versus nonprofit hospitals, and public versus nonprofit 
hospitals;
3 and ε z is an independently-distributed error term, with E(ε z | dlnPz, Xz, Mz) = 0.  We 
weight each observation by the number of beds of ownership type k in zip code z, Cz
k. 
  We reestimate model (1) including controls for baseline 1985 beds per capita as a control 
variable, to investigate the extent to which our results are sensitive to differences in baseline 
capacity that are correlated with ownership status across areas: 
(2)   dlnCz
k = α k + β
+dlnPz
+
  + β
-dlnPz
-
  + Xzφ  + Mzγ  + θ lnCz,85 + ε z. 
  We also estimate two expanded models to investigate whether the responsiveness of 
capacity to population shifts varies by 1985 baseline characteristics of hospital markets.  First, 
we estimate models that interact lnCz with dlnP, to investigate the extent to which capacity is 
differentially responsive to demand in high- versus low-capacity areas: 
(3) dlnCz = α k + β
+dlnPz
+
  + β
-dlnPz
-
  +  δ
+ lnCz,85 *dlnPz
+
  + δ
- lnCz,85 *dlnPz
-
  +  
+ θ lnCz,85 + Xzφ  + Mzγ  + ε z. 
Second, we estimate models that interact Mz with dlnPz: 
(4)  dlnCz = α k + β
+dlnPz
+
  + β
-dlnPz
-
  +  δ
+ Mz*dlnPz
+
  + δ
-Mz*dlnPz
-
  + Xzφ  + Mzγ  + ε z. 
                                            
3 See Kessler and McClellan (2001) for a detailed description of how these variables were constructed.  
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Estimates from this model will show, for example, the extent to which capacity of different 
ownership forms respond differently to demand in more versus less competitive markets. 
 
III. DATA 
  We use data from four sources.  First, we use data on U.S. hospital characteristics 
collected by the American Hospital Association (AHA).  The response rate of hospitals to the 
AHA survey is greater than 90 percent, with response rates above 95 percent for large hospitals 
(>300 beds).  We exclude rural hospitals and hospitals owned by the federal government 
(primarily Veterans’ Administration hospitals) because the process governing capacity decisions 
for these hospitals may differ from other hospitals.  We analyze the capacity of only those 
hospitals that ever reported providing general medical or surgical services (for example, we 
exclude psychiatric and rehabilitation hospitals from analysis).  To assess hospital size and bed 
capacity per patient, we use total general medical/surgical beds, including ICU/CCU and 
emergency beds.  We classify hospitals as teaching hospitals if they report at least 20 full-time 
residents.  
  Second, we use a hospital system database constructed from multiple sources (see 
Madison 2001 for a detailed discussion).  The AHA survey contains extensive year-by-year 
information on hospital system membership status.  Our validity checking indicated that the 
universe of systems and system hospitals, and the timing of hospitals’ system membership, as 
defined by AHA did not conform to discussion of hospital systems in the trade press such as 
Modern Healthcare.  We therefore created our own system database based on a combination of 
the AHA and other sources.  We classify hospitals as for-profit, secular nonprofit, religious  
14 
nonprofit, or publicly-owned.  We classify all public hospitals as non-system hospitals because 
system membership of public hospitals in our data did not reflect reliably actual transfer of 
control to an outside entity.   
  Third, we use Medicare enrollment data to calculate the size and age/gender/race 
distribution of each non-rural zip code’s elderly population.  The Health Care Financing 
Adminstration’s HISKEW enrollment files include demographic information on virtually all 
elderly Americans (including those enrolled in Medicare HMOs) because of the extremely high 
rate of takeup in the Medicare program. 
  Fourth, we use comprehensive Medicare claims data on the hospital choices of virtually 
all elderly Medicare beneficiaries with heart attack in 1985, matched with the three data sources 
described above, to estimate a model of patients’ demand for hospital services as a function of 
travel distances between patients and hospitals, the characteristics of patients, and the 
characteristics of hospitals.  With these estimates, we construct measures of patient flows to 
hospitals of different broad types (ownership status, size, teaching status, system membership 
status) that are based only on the arguably exogenous factors described above.  Then, we 
calculate a vector of six indicator variables describing the hospital market characteristics of each 
zip code in 1985 as described above (see Kessler and McClellan 2000, 2002 for a detailed 
discussion). 
  Table 1 describes how hospital capacity under different ownership forms has changed 
over the 1985-1994 period, and the sources of those changes.  Table 1 decomposes changes in 
the number of hospital beds (and the facilities experiencing changes in beds) into four exhaustive 
and mutually exclusive categories: changes due to conversions (changes in ownership status),  
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changes due to opens and closes, changes due to mergers and spinoffs, and changes due to 
changes in bed size (absent a conversion, open/close, or merger/spinoff).  The most salient 
feature of the hospital industry during our study period was a massive contraction in capacity. 
  In percentage terms, religious nonprofit hospitals experienced the greatest contraction in 
bed capacity (32.5 percent), with public hospitals close behind (29.6 percent).   For-profit beds 
contracted by 21.4 percent, while nonreligious nonprofit beds contracted the least, by 20 percent.  
These simple percentages do not give a clear picture of relative supply response, however, 
because the environments in which these four forms of ownership are found tend to differ.  In 
particular, at the beginning of the study period, nonprofit hospitals, in comparison with for-profit 
hospitals, tended to be concentrated in areas with unusually high levels of capacity, where the 
need for reduction in capacity was presumably greatest.   In results not presented in Table 1, the 
correlation coefficient between Mz
5  (=1 if the concentration of for-profit/nonprofit admissions in 
the zip code were above the median, 0 otherwise) and log(capacity per person in 1985) is .062, p 
< .01, and the correlation coefficient between Mz
6 (=1 if the concentration of public/nonprofit 
admissions in the zip code were above the median, 0 otherwise) and log(capacity per person in 
1985) is .025, p < .01. 
In recent years, much attention has been focused on conversions of nonprofit hospitals to 
for-profit form – attention that has been due, in part, to concerns about private profiteering that 
accompanying some of these conversions (see, e.g., Sloan, Taylor, and Conover 2000).  Table 1 
suggests that the pattern of conversion activity is not well described, however, as an overall shift 
of capacity from nonprofit to for-profit form.  Rather, Table 1 shows that conversions were in 
fact a net source of increase in secular nonprofit hospital beds between 1985 and 1994, and it  
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further shows that, in aggregate, net conversion activity in that period was out of both public and 
religious nonprofit hospitals and into both for-profit and secular nonprofit hospitals.   
To provide a more refined view of conversion activity, Table 2 tabulates the conversions 
in our data according to the ownership status of the hospitals involved both before and after the 
conversion.  Those data show that, while there is a substantial number of conversions directly 
from secular nonprofit to for-profit form, there are also nearly two-thirds as many conversions in 
the reverse direction – likely as a response to declining profitability.  The principal net 
conversion activity across ownership forms is, instead, from public hospitals to secular nonprofit 
hospitals, which accounts for nearly all of the overall net increase in secular nonprofit hospitals 
through conversion during the period in question.
4 
Table 3 shows how residential zip codes’ hospital capacity responds to changes in 
population, according to the size of the zip codes’ MSA, and previews the results of our 
regression models.  Table 3 reports the 1985-1994 percentage change in the four hospital 
ownership types’ capacity by MSA size for fast- growing versus slow-growing MSAs.  
Specifically, Table 3 groups zip codes according to the quartile of the zips’ urban 1985 elderly 
population, with 80 MSAs in each quartile.  Then, within each population quartile, each of the 80 
MSAs is classified into one of two groups of 40 MSAs, depending on its 1985-1994 growth in 
elderly population.   
Table 3 shows that, in the second and third population quartiles, variation across MSAs in 
supply response is consistent with the predictions that follow from the organizational incentives 
discussed in Section I.  Capacity for all ownership types decreased in each group of MSAs, as  
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one would expect in an industry generally characterized by substantial overcapacity.  For all 
ownership types except secular nonprofits, moreover, the percentage reduction in capacity is 
markedly greater in the slow-growing MSAs than in the fast-growing MSAs.  For example, for-
profit capacity in areas in the second population quartile shrank by 26.8 percent in fast-growing 
MSAs, but by 37.8 percent slow-growing MSAs.  For secular nonprofit hospitals, however, not 
only is the relative rate of capacity reduction in fast- versus slow-growing MSAs much smaller 
than the relative rate of contraction for the other three ownership forms, but also the absolute rate 
of contraction in fast-growing MSAs is actually higher than the rate of contraction in slow-
growing MSAs. 
The rates of capacity change in the most-populous and least-populous MSA quartiles 
present a more complex pattern.  In particular, Table 3 shows that, among the most populous 
MSAs, for-profit hospitals exited the faster-growing MSAs at a slightly faster rate than they 
exited slower-growing MSAs.  At the same time, for-profit hospitals actually expanded capacity 
in the slowest-growing MSAs in the least populous quartile.  Both these results are consistent 
with a wholesale shift by for-profit hospitals from the largest urban areas to smaller MSAs, 
regardless of expected trends in demand.  The figures for the least populous quartile of MSAs, 
including particularly the large percentage increase in for-profit capacity that appears there, are 
also affected by the small number of institutions from which the figures are computed:  the 
quartile of least populous MSAs contains dramatically fewer hospital beds than does the quartile 
containing the most populous MSAs. 
                                                                                                                                              
4 There is, however, an important caveat to be added here.  We do not count as a conversion the potentially 
important phenomenon of nonprofit hospitals’ contracting-out management of its facility to a for-profit firm.  
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The fact that the response to changing demand of hospitals of different ownership types 
differs depending on the characteristics of the cities in which they are located motivates our 
regression models.  Those models identify the effects of changing demand on capacity based on 
within-MSA variation in population rather than on variation across MSAs, to control for such 
unobserved differences in hospitals’ strategies.  Specifically, we estimate the effect, on zip-code 
level measures of changes in capacity, of zip-code changes in demand and zip-code hospital 
market characteristics, holding constant MSA fixed effects.  Descriptive statistics of all of the 
variables used in the regression analysis appear in Table 4.   
 
IV. RESULTS 
  Table 5 presents estimates of the effect of population changes and base year hospital 
market characteristics on changes in differently-owned forms of hospital capacity from model 
(1).  For hospitals overall, and for each individual ownership type, responsiveness to increases in 
demand, as proxied by population increases, is lower than responsiveness to decreases in 
demand, controlling for other market characteristics.  A one percent increase in population leads 
to a .017 percent increase in overall capacity, holding other factors constant, while a one percent 
population decrease leads to a .095 percent decrease in overall capacity.  This is what one would 
expect in an industry generally characterized by overcapacity. 
Comparing the second through fifth columns of the first row of Table 5 shows that 
responsiveness to increases in demand for secular nonprofits is similar to that for religious 
nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, and rather lower than that of public institutions.  This is 
perhaps because the expansionary incentives facing (the managers of) secular nonprofits, which  
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– as we have suggested above – are arguably greater than those present in the other three 
ownership types, are counterbalanced by the greater difficulty that secular nonprofits face in 
obtaining rapid access to capital. 
Of primary interest to us here, however, is the relative responsiveness to decreases in 
demand exhibited by hospitals under different forms of ownership.  Here, the results in Table 5 
follow precisely the pattern that our theoretical discussion would predict.  For-profit capacity is 
most responsive to decreases in demand.  Next most responsive are public capacity and religious 
nonprofit capacity, for which the estimated coefficients are nearly identical.  Secular nonprofit 
capacity is distinctly the least responsive to decreases in demand, with a coefficient that is less 
than half the coefficient for public and religious nonprofit capacity, and only one third of the 
coefficient for the responsiveness of for-profit capacity. 
Tables 6 and 7 present estimates of models (2) and (3), respectively.  Estimates of model 
(2) from Table 6 differ from the estimates of model (1) from Table 5 in that the former are 
calculated controlling baseline (1985) total hospital capacity per elderly Medicare beneficiary.  
Estimates of model (3) from Table 7 differ from the estimates of model (1) in Table 5 in that the 
former are calculated controlling for baseline hospital capacity plus baseline capacity interacted 
with the two population change variables, producing estimates of the effect of demand 
responsiveness that vary with the level of baseline capacity. 
  Table 6 shows that, especially for both forms of nonprofit capacity, the estimated 
responsiveness of capacity to increases in population grows larger once baseline capacity is held 
constant.  The results are similar for the alternative specification in Table 7.  In both Tables 6 and 
7, this increase in responsiveness is offset by a significant negative effect of high baseline  
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capacity on the rate of growth in capacity.  These are the results one would expect:  there is less 
need to expand capacity to meet growing demand when the capacity in place is already unusually 
large. 
  The estimated responsiveness of capacity to population decreases remains essentially 
unchanged from Table 5 to Table 6 for all forms of ownership, even though baseline capacity is 
statistically significantly correlated with population decreases, just as it is with population 
increases (from analysis not in the table, D = .106 and D = -.047, respectively).  One possible 
interpretation is that areas with declining population are already marked by sufficient 
overcapacity that they are contracting as fast as feasible (given organizational constraints), and 
that the added stimulus of yet further overcapacity has no important effect on the rate of 
contraction.  In Table 7, the responsiveness of capacity to decreases in population drops 
substantially for all ownership types.  High-capacity areas are less responsive to decreases in 
demand than are low-capacity areas, likely due to the same factors – not captured in these 
models – that were responsible for the high capacity to begin with. 
  Table 8 presents estimates of model (4), which allows the effects on capacity of increases 
and decreases in population to vary by hospital market characteristics.  For-profit hospitals adjust 
to demand contractions much more rapidly when the market is concentrated, as, to a much lesser 
extent, do religious nonprofits.  Secular nonprofit hospitals, in contrast, do not respond 
differently to demand contractions in concentrated versus unconcentrated markets.
5  One 
possible interpretation is that individual institutions internalize more of the gains from capacity 
reduction when they have a larger market share, and thus have a stronger incentive to eliminate 
                                            
5 In results not presented in the table, we also reestimated equation (4) with controls for baseline 1985 capacity per 
capita (as we did for equation (1), with results in Table 5), which had no substantial effect on this finding.    
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excess capacity in such circumstances – but only if the institutions value profitability above size 
and survival, which is presumably true of for-profit hospitals but may not be true of secular 
nonprofits.  Differences by ownership status in the response of capacity to population increases 
in concentrated versus unconcentrated markets follow a different pattern.  For-profit and public 
hospitals adjust to demand increases statistically significantly more rapidly in concentrated 
markets, whereas religious nonprofits adjust to demand increases statistically significantly less 
rapidly, reflecting the conflicting incentives for, and constraints on, expansion of hospitals of 
different ownership statuses discussed above. 
Tables 9 through 13 present estimates of model (1) analogous to those in Table 4, but 
decomposed by the source of the change in capacity.  Each table decomposes the changes in a 
single ownership form’s capacity into four exhaustive and mutually exclusive sources:  opens 
and closes, conversions, mergers and spinoffs, and changes in bed size.
6  Table 9 gives results for 
hospital capacity in aggregate.  The exhaustive/exclusive nature of the decomposition is reflected 
in the fact that the coefficients across columns in Table 9 add to approximately the coefficients in 
column 1 of Table 2.  Tables 10 through 13 give results for each ownership form taken 
separately.   
Table 9 indicates that, as means of responding to both increases and decreases in demand, 
neither conversions nor mergers/spinoffs are significant vehicles for all forms of ownership in 
aggregate.  This is not surprising, since those transactions do not in themselves lead to any 
change in aggregate capacity, although they can be the occasion for change.  More interesting is 
                                            
6 The effects of population (and other covariates) on changes in an ownership form’s capacity due to different causes 
do not necessarily average to the total effects on that ownership form because the a zip code’s percentage change in 
the (counterfactually constructed) capacity due to the four causes does not necessarily average to a zip code’s total 
percentage change in capacity.  
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the result that opens/closes, but not changes in bed size, is a significant means of responding to 
increases in demand.  One reason for this pattern may be that areas with increasing population 
are often newly developed sections of MSAs that are far from existing facilities, and hence not 
easily served by expanding those facilities; rather, new facilities must be built to serve those 
areas.  Another reason may be that, with changes in technology, it is often easier to build an 
entirely new facility than to expand an existing one. 
  The most surprising result in Table 8, however, is that only changes in bed size, and not 
opens/closes, are a significant means of reducing aggregate hospital capacity in response to 
decreases in demand.  This result is due to the fact that (as seen in Tables 9 and 10) both secular 
and religious nonprofit hospitals use reductions in bed capacity much more than closure of 
facilities to respond to decreasing demand, consistent with the strong managerialist bias against 
complete exit that theory suggests we would find at least among secular nonprofits.   
At first glance, Tables 10-13 appear to suggest that conversions are not used to transform 
the ownership structure of beds in response to demand changes:  rows 1 and 2, column 2 of 
Tables 10-13 are small and statistically insignificant.  However, this may be an artifact of our 
limited definition of conversion (i.e., same name and AHA identifier in 1985 and 1994, but with 
a different ownership status), which may exclude some changes in control that were de facto 
conversions.   Tables 10-13 hint that this may be the case.  In areas of decreasing population, 
nonprofit capacity contracts through opens/closes, while for-profit and public hospitals actually 
expand capacity significantly through opens/closes, suggesting that some of the closes and opens 
involved may actually be conversions.  This finding underscores one potential limitation of the 
analysis of tables 10-13:  any classification of changes in capacities into mutually exclusive  
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categories necessarily involves some arbitrary decisions that may not reflect the complex 
realities of the changing structure of the hospital industry. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Numerous empirical studies have sought to identify how differences in the incentives 
facing managers of nonprofit and for-profit firms lead to differences in economic performance.
7  
Many of these studies have taken the hospital industry as their focus.  Depending on the 
dimension of performance examined, these studies have reported both similarities and 
differences across ownership forms.
8  We have focused here on a largely neglected aspect of 
performance – rapidity of exit -- where differences in behavior between nonprofit and for-profit 
hospitals seem likely to be unusually pronounced, and where those differences may have 
important implications for the overall structure and performance of the industry. 
Managers of for-profit hospitals, and to a lesser degree also managers of public hospitals 
and of religiously affiliated nonprofit hospitals, have an incentive to minimize costs of service, 
and hence to eliminate unused or underused capacity.  Managers of unaffiliated nonprofit 
institutions, in contrast, may not feel such an incentive so long as net cash flow does not become 
negative.  Consequently, it is a plausible hypothesis that nonprofit hospitals adjust capacity much 
more slowly than do for-profit firms in response to reductions in demand, effectively serving as 
capital traps. 
                                            
7 See Scott Morton and Podolny (2001) for work on related question:  how differences in the incentives of hobbyist 
versus professional managers lead to differences in price and quality in the California wine industry. 
8 Compare, for example, Kessler and McClellan (2002), who find that areas with a presence of for-profit hospitals 
have lower levels of hospital expenditures but virtually the same patient health outcomes to Duggan (2000), who 
finds that nonprofit firms responded as strongly as for-profit firms to a California program that greatly increased 
immediate financial incentives to treat the indigent.  
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The results presented here provide strong support for that hypothesis.  For-profit hospitals 
are the most responsive to reductions in demand, followed in turn by public and religiously 
affiliated nonprofit hospitals, while secular nonprofits are distinctly the least responsive of the 
four ownership types. 
It follows that, if excess capacity is a continuing social problem in the hospital sector, 
then the high density of nonprofit firms, which are the legacy of a very different era of hospital 
technology and financing, may be in large part responsible.  This suggests, in turn, that 
encouraging exit by nonprofit institutions – and particularly by secular nonprofits – may enhance 
efficiency.  For example, the withdrawal of federal, state, and local tax exemption from nonprofit 
hospitals, or at least from those that do not provide substantial amounts of uncompensated care 
(much as federal tax exemption was withdrawn from nonprofit health insurance companies in 
1986) could lead to a reallocation of assets to more productive uses.  Alternatively, facilitating 
conversion to more cost-sensitive forms of organization by altering the fiduciary duties of 
nonprofit directors under corporate law to deny them the right to “just say no” to acquisition 
offers from other firms, and particularly from for-profit firms (Hansmann, 1996a, 2000), could 
accomplish the same goal.  The latter reform would restrict the defensive tactics available to the 
managers of nonprofit corporations even more severely than those available to the managers of 
business corporations.  Given, however, that nonprofit institutions by their nature are relatively 
insensitive to market pressures for exit, more expansive legally imposed fiduciary duties may be 
socially optimal.   25 
Table 1: Sources of Changes in Hospital Capacity, 1985-1994 
 
 Beds  Facilities 
 Total  For-
profit 
Nonprofit 
secular    |  religious  
Public Total  For-
profit 
Nonprofit 
 secular    | religious  
Public 
1985  total    546,321 63,276 296,650  116,134 70,261  2,684  449  1,401  445  389 
1994  total  414,716 49,711 237,232 78,339  49,434  2,363  383  1,284  388  308 
Net  change  -131,605  -13,565 -59,418 -37,795 -20,827  -321  -66  -117  -57  -81 
%  of  1985  total  -24.1% -21.4% -20.0% -32.5% -29.6% -12.0% -14.7%  -8.4%  -12.8% -20.8% 
1985-94  opens  and  closes          
     Gross gains  13,524  4,091  7,231  1,022  1,180  110  39  50  12  9 
     Gross losses  42,325  9,313  20,495  5,843  6,674  343  99  158  36  50 
     Net change  -28,801  -5,222  -13,264  -4,821  -5,494  -233  -60  -108  -24  -41 
     % of 85 total  -5.3%  -8.3%  -4.5%  -4.2%  -7.8%  -8.7%  -13.4%  -7.7%  -5.4%  -10.5% 
1985-94  conversions          
     Gross gains  38,257  5,757  22,359  7,011  3,130  242  51  125  46  20 
     Gross losses  50,177  4,718  17,746  17,494  10,219  242  32  89  65  56 
     Net change  -11,920  1,039  4,613  -10,483  -7,089  0  19  36  -19  -36 
      % of 85 total  -2.2%  1.6%  1.6%  -9.0%  -10.1%  0.0%  4.2%  2.6%  -4.3%  -9.3% 
1985-94  mergers  and  spinoffs         
     Gross gains  36,367  3,795  21,678  8,078  2,816  137  22   81  26  8 
     Gross losses  48,644  6,370  28,572  10,602  3,100  225  47  126  40  12 
     Net change  -12,277  -2,575  -6,894  -2,524  -284  -88  -25  -45  -14  -4 
     % of 85 total  -2.2%  -4.1%  -2.3%  -2.2%  -0.4%  -3.3%  -5.6%  -3.2%  -3.1%  -1.0% 
1985-94 changes in bed size               
     Gross gains  7,597  1,581  3,481  1,546  989  306  54  155  40  57 
     Gross losses  86,504  8,388  47,654  21,513  8,949  1,474  196   816  258  204 
     Net change  -78,907  -6,807  -44,173  -19,967  -7,960  -1,168  -142  -661  -218  -147 
     % of 85 total  -14.4%  -10.8%  -14.9%  -17.2%  -11.3%  -43.5%  -31.6%  -47.2%  -49.0%  -37.8% 
Facilities without changes          21  62  6  10 
Notes: Includes only nonrural, nonfederal hospitals that ever reported providing general medical or surgical services. 1994 total facilities = 1985 total facilities + 
net change due to opens and closes + net change due to conversions + net change due to mergers and spinoffs.  1985 total facilities = gross losses due to opens 
and closes + gross losses due to conversions + gross losses due to mergers and spinoffs + facilities experiencing gross gains due to changes in bed size + facilities 
experiencing gross losses due to changes in bed size + facilities without changes.26 
Table 2: Sources and Products of Hospital Conversions, 1985-1994 
 



















Nonprofit  Secular   38 37 14  89 
Nonprofit  Religious  56   8 1 65 
For-Profit  22  5  5 32 
Public 47  3  6    56 
Total  125  46 51 20   
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Table 3: Percentage Changes in Hospital Capacity in Fast- and Slow-Growing MSAs, by MSA Size and Ownership Status 
1985-1994 
 
  All MSAs  Least populous 
MSAs 
MSAs in second 
population quartile 
MSAs in third 

































All  ownership  forms  -23.7% -25.7% -18.9% -33.0% -23.1% -27.9% -20.1% -25.7% -25.4% -25.0% 
            
For-profit  -24.2%  -25.9% -6.1% 155.0%    -26.8%  -37.8% -7.4% -35.8%  -30.4%  -26.3% 
            
Nonprofit  secular  -20.9% -20.8%    7.1%  -34.8% -24.3% -18.0% -23.2% -16.2% -21.2% -20.9% 
            
Nonprofit  religious  -25.0% -35.3% -41.0% -43.4% -13.6% -39.9% -25.7% -33.6% -26.0% -34.5% 
            
Public  -29.2% -34.4% -33.2% -43.0% -29.3% -46.2% -15.0% -37.5% -32.6% -31.6% 
            
Number  of  MSAs  160  160  40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
 
Notes: Population quartile cutpoints are based on elderly Medicare beneficiary enrollments of 15,005, 27,387, and 63,867.  Fast-growing/slow-
growing cutpoints are 17.0 percent for the least populous MSAs, 14.7 percent for second quartile, 15.3 percent for third quartile, 12.3 percent for 
the most populous MSAs.  28 
Table 4: Characteristics of Zip Codes Used in Regression Analysis 
 
Variable N  Mean  Std  Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
Capacity, 1985  12753  24.754  19.274  0.420  275.842 
   secular nonprofit capacity  12753  13.877  12.846  0.000  127.115 
   religious nonprofit capacity  12753  5.018  7.114  0.000  148.047 
   for-profit capacity  12753  2.787  5.970  0.000  63.160 
   public capacity  12753  3.071  5.286  0.000  77.473 
Log change in capacity, 1985-94  12753  -0.298  0.277  -4.465  4.041 
   secular nonprofit capacity  12253  -0.242  0.518  -5.795  4.502 
   religious nonprofit capacity  11010  -0.375  0.636  -6.010  6.194 
   for-profit capacity  6178  -0.277  0.655  -3.747  4.795 
   public capacity  10020  -0.411  0.769  -5.600  4.711 
          
Log change in population, 1985-1994  12753  0.176  0.517  -4.736  6.581 
ln(beds per capita in 1985)  12753  -1.921  1.420  -6.137  4.500 
Very concentrated hospital market  12753  0.371  0.483  0.000  1.000 
Above median density of for-profit/nonprofit  12753  0.441  0.497  0.000  1.000 
Above median density of public/nonprofit  12753  0.479  0.500  0.000  1.000 
Above median density of large hospitals  12753  0.400  0.490  0.000  1.000 
Above median density of teaching hospitals  12753  0.410  0.492  0.000  1.000 
Above median density 
of system hospitals 
12753 0.484  0.500  0.000  1.000 
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Table 5:  Effect of Increases and Decreases in Population and 1985 Hospital Market Characteristics 
on Changes in Hospital Bed Capacity, 1985-1994 
 
 






secular             religious  For-profit  Public 
 
dln(pop),  increases  0.017**  0.023** 0.017 0.033**  0.053** 
  (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) 
 
dln(pop), decreases  0.095** 0.043** 0.109** 0.146** 0.110** 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
Characteristics of hospital market in 1985 
 
Very concentrated  -0.014**  0.000  -0.023  -0.124**  -0.117** 
hospital  market  (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.024) (0.020) 
 
Above median density   -0.010  0.056**  0.013  -0.332**  -0.233** 
of  for-profit/nonprofit  (0.008) (0.011) (0.017) (0.039) (0.026) 
 
Above median density   -0.021** 0.054** -0.044** -0.062** -0.261** 
of  public/nonprofit  (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.019) (0.024) 
 
Above median density  0.029**  0.047**  0.032**  0.015  -0.059** 
of  large  hospitals  (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019) 
 
Above median density   0.010*  0.029** 0.001  0.019 0.125** 
teaching  hospitals  (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.017) (0.020) 
 
Above median density  -0.003  0.021**  -0.008  -0.133**  0.004 
of  system  hospitals  (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.018) 
       
  
Notes:  Number of zips with nonmissing change in capacity for all ownership types is 12,753, for secular nonprofit 
is 12,252, for religious nonprofit is 11,010, for for-profit is 6,178, and for public is 10,020.  ** denotes statistical 
significance at a 5 percent level; * denotes statistical significance at a 10 percent level. 30 
Table 6:  Effect of Increases and Decreases in Population and 1985 Hospital Market Characteristics on 
Changes in Hospital Bed Capacity, 1985-1994, including controls for baseline 1985 capacity per person 
 
  






secular             religious  For-profit  Public 
 
dln(pop),  increases  0.026** 0.036** 0.044** 0.049** 0.056** 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) 
 
dln(pop), decreases  0.091** 0.037** 0.096** 0.142** 0.109** 
  (0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) 
 
Characteristics of hospital market in 1985 
 
ln(beds per capita in   -0.006**  -0.008**  -0.017**  -0.010**  -0.002 
1985)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
Very concentrated  -0.014**  0.000  -0.022  -0.126**  -0.117** 
hospital  market  (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.024) (0.020) 
 
Above median density   -0.011 0.055** 0.010 -0.336**  -0.234** 
of  for-profit/nonprofit  (0.008) (0.011) (0.017) (0.039) (0.026) 
 
Above median density   -0.021**  0.054**  -0.043**  -0.061**  -0.261** 
of  public/nonprofit  (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.019) (0.024) 
 
Above median density  0.029** 0.046** 0.031**  0.018  -0.059** 
of  large  hospitals  (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019) 
 
Above  median  density    0.010 0.029** 0.001  0.018 0.124** 
of  teaching  hospitals  (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.017) (0.020) 
 
Above median density  -0.003 0.021** -0.008 -0.133** 0.004 
of  system  hospitals  (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.018) 
       
  
Notes:  See notes to table 2. 31 
Table 7:  Effect of Increases and Decreases in Population and 1985 Hospital Market Characteristics on 











secular             religious  for-profit  public 
 
dln(pop), increases  0.039** 0.046** 0.051** 0.068** 0.062** 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) 
 
dln(pop),  decreases  0.034** 0.004 0.087** 0.034 0.059** 
  (0.007) (0.012) (0.015) (0.021) (0.019) 
 
Interactions between ln(population) and ln(beds per capita) in 1985 
 
dln(pop),  increases*  -0.017** -0.016** -0.025** -0.022** -0.026** 
Ln(beds/cap in 1985)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.008) 
 
dln(pop), decreases*  -0.035** -0.024**  -0.004  -0.049** -0.026** 
Ln(beds/cap in 1985)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
 
Characteristics of hospital market in 1985     
 
ln(beds per capita in   -0.007**  -0.007**  -0.011**  -0.012**  0.000 
1985)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
 
Very concentrated  -0.010  0.003  -0.018  -0.121**  -0.111** 
Hospital  market  (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.023) (0.020) 
 
Above median density   -0.010  0.056**  0.010  -0.334**  -0.231** 
of  for-profit/nonprofit  (0.008) (0.011) (0.016) (0.038) (0.026) 
 
Above median density   -0.022**  0.053**  -0.044**  -0.057**  -0.261** 
of  public/nonprofit  (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.018) (0.024) 
 
Above median density  0.031**  0.048**  0.033**  0.016  -0.055** 
of large hospitals  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.019) 
 
Above median density   0.012*  0.030**  0.005  0.023  0.128** 
of teaching hospitals  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.017)  (0.020) 
 
Above median density  -0.005 0.019** -0.010 -0.136** 0.000 
of system hospitals  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
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Table 8:  Differential Effects of Increases and Decreases in Population 
on Changes in Hospital Bed Capacity, 1985-1994, 
by Characteristics of Hospital Market in 1985 
 
 






secular             religious  For-profit  Public 
 
dln(pop), increases  0.022  0.002  0.107**  -0.216**  -0.006 
  (0.014) (0.021) (0.028) (0.070) (0.055) 
 
dln(pop), decreases  0.126**  0.169**  0.034  0.116  0.054 
  (0.020) (0.030) (0.043) (0.105) (0.082) 
 
Interactions between ln(population) and characteristics of hospital market in 1985 
 
Very concentrated mkt*  0.044** -0.010 -0.123**  0.131**  0.086** 
ln(population  increase)  (0.013) (0.021) (0.026) (0.032) (0.034) 
 
Very concentrated mkt*  0.124**  -0.037  0.078**  0.682**  0.023 
ln(population  decrease)  (0.016) (0.028) (0.039) (0.048) (0.038) 
 
High  for-profit/nonprofit* -0.032** -0.013 -0.056** 0.097  0.001 
ln(population  increase)  (0.012) (0.019) (0.023) (0.066) (0.036) 
 
High  for-profit/nonprofit* 0.083** 0.085** -0.022 -0.254**  0.132** 
ln(population  decrease)  (0.015) (0.024) (0.030) (0.105) (0.042) 
 
High public/nonprofit*  -0.001  0.012  0.035  0.096**  -0.005 
ln(population  increase)  (0.010) (0.016) (0.021) (0.025) (0.047) 
 
High public/nonprofit*  -0.075**  -0.088**  0.106**  0.035  -0.041 
ln(population  decrease)  (0.015) (0.023) (0.029) (0.046) (0.074) 
 
High density of large*   -0.026**  0.024  -0.023  -0.116**  -0.052* 
ln(population  increase)  (0.011) (0.018) (0.022) (0.024) (0.031) 
 
High density of large*  -0.036**  -0.054**  0.111**  -0.084**  0.091** 
ln(population  decrease)  (0.014) (0.022) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) 
 
High density of teaching*  -0.009  -0.004  -0.084**  0.058*  0.027 
ln(population  increase)  (0.012) (0.020) (0.024) (0.032) (0.036) 
 
High density of teaching*  -0.067**  -0.123**  -0.053  0.171**  -0.084** 
ln(population  decrease)  (0.016) (0.026) (0.037) (0.037) (0.042) 
 
High density of system*  0.027**  0.025  -0.003  0.133**  0.085** 
ln(population  increase)  (0.011) (0.017) (0.023) (0.030) (0.032) 
 
High density of system*  -0.019  -0.013  -0.042*  0.195**  -0.089** 
ln(population  decrease)  (0.012) (0.019) (0.025) (0.035) (0.033) 
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Table 9:  Effect of Increases and Decreases in Population and 1985 Hospital Market Characteristics on 
Changes in Total Hospital Bed Capacity, 1985-1994 
 
 
Dependent variable is zip-code level change in ln(capacity) due to… 
 
 
Opens/closes conversions  merger/spinoff 
changes in bed 
size 
 
dln(pop), increases  0.007** 0.001  0.002  0.004 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
 
dln(pop), decreases  0.000  0.001  -0.002  0.089** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
 
Characteristics of hospital market in 1985 
 
Very concentrated  0.004**  0.000  0.005**  -0.027** 
hospital market  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
 
Above median density   -0.007**  -0.012**  0.011**  0.000 
of for-profit/nonprofit  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
 
Above median density   -0.004**  -0.008**  0.007**  -0.013** 
of public/nonprofit  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
 
Above median density  0.010** -0.001  -0.002 0.017** 
of large hospitals  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
 
Above median density   -0.011**  0.002  0.015**  0.003 
of teaching hospitals  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
 
Above median density  -0.005** 0.000 -0.014**  0.015** 
of system hospitals  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
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Table 10:  Effect of Increases and Decreases in Population and 1985 Hospital Market Characteristics on 
Changes in Nonprofit Secular Hospital Bed Capacity, 1985-1994 
 
 
Dependent variable is zip-code level change in ln(capacity) due to… 
 
 
opens/closes conversions  merger/spinoff 
changes in bed 
size 
 
dln(pop), increases  0.006** 0.003  0.003  0.009* 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
 
dln(pop), decreases  0.005**  0.001  -0.011  0.079** 
  (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) 
 
Characteristics of hospital market in 1985 
 
Very concentrated  0.006**  0.012**  0.001  -0.021** 
hospital market  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
 
Above median density   -0.003  0.020**  0.015**  -0.018** 
of for-profit/nonprofit  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.007) 
 
Above median density   0.004**  0.028**  0.001  -0.016** 
of public/nonprofit  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
 
Above median density  0.005** 0.026** -0.013** 0.020** 
of large hospitals  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.005) 
 
Above median density   -0.009**  -0.010**  0.020**  0.017** 
of teaching hospitals  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
 
Above median density  0.001 -0.015**  -0.010**  0.025** 
of system hospitals  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
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Table 11:  Effect of Increases and Decreases in Population and 1985 Hospital Market Characteristics on 
Changes in Nonprofit religious Hospital Bed Capacity, 1985-1994 
 
 
Dependent variable is zip-code level change in ln(capacity) due to… 
 
 
opens/closes conversions  merger/spinoff 
Changes in bed 
size 
 
dln(pop), increases  0.004** -0.003 0.011**  0.004 
  (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) 
 
dln(pop), decreases  0.002  0.007  0.018**  0.087** 
  (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
 
Characteristics of hospital market in 1985 
 
Very concentrated  0.004**  -0.013        0.034**  -0.049** 
hospital  market  (0.002) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) 
 
Above median density   0.010**  -0.067**  0.008  0.049** 
of for-profit/nonprofit  (0.002)  (0.010)       (0.006)  (0.009) 
 
Above median density   -0.011**  -0.043**  0.048**  -0.010 
of  public/nonprofit  (0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
 
Above median density  0.006** -0.011 0.012** -0.007 
of large hospitals  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.007) 
 
Above median density   -0.020**  0.000  0.023**  -0.003 
of teaching hospitals  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.007) 
 
Above median density  0.016** -0.007 -0.022** 0.010 
of system hospitals  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
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Table 12:  Effect of Increases and Decreases in Population and 1985 Hospital Market Characteristics on 
Changes in For-Profit Hospital Bed Capacity, 1985-1994 
 
 
Dependent variable is zip-code level change in ln(capacity) due to… 
 




dln(pop), increases  0.015** -0.010  0.004  0.020** 
  (0.003) (0.007) (0.005)  (0.007) 
 
dln(pop), decreases  -0.017**  -0.006  0.003  0.145** 
  (0.004) (0.008) (0.006)  (0.008) 
 
Characteristics of hospital market in 1985 
 
Very concentrated  -0.009  -0.049**  -0.048**  0.000 
hospital market  (0.007)  (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.013) 
 
Above median density   0.000  -0.161**  -0.005  -0.003 
of for-profit/nonprofit  (0.010)  (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.020) 
 
Above median density   -0.003  -0.010  -0.007  -0.035** 
of public/nonprofit  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.011) 
 
Above median density  -0.005 -0.028** 0.031** 0.030** 
of large hospitals  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.008) 
 
Above median density   -0.021**  0.016*  0.032**  -0.006 
of teaching hospitals  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.010) 
 
Above median density  -0.031** 0.012 -0.088**  -0.025** 
of system hospitals  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.010) 
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Table 13:  Effect of Increases and Decreases in Population and 1985 Hospital Market Characteristics on 
Changes in Public Hospital Bed Capacity, 1985-1994 
 
 
Dependent variable is zip-code level change in ln(capacity) due to… 
 
 
opens/closes conversions  merger/spinoff 
changes in bed 
size 
 
dln(pop), increases  0.008*  0.041**  -0.004  -0.003 
  (0.004) (0.011) (0.003) (0.008) 
 
dln(pop), decreases  -0.008*  -0.019*  0.000  0.106** 
  (0.004) (0.011) (0.003) (0.008) 
 
Characteristics of hospital market in 1985 
 
Very concentrated  0.044** -0.101** 0.011**  -0.018 
hospital market  (0.006)  (0.015)  (0.005)  (0.011) 
 
Above median density   -0.019**  -0.105**  0.007  -0.063** 
of for-profit/nonprofit  (0.008)  (0.020)  (0.006)  (0.015) 
 
Above median density   -0.029**  -0.155**  -0.018**  0.006 
of public/nonprofit  (0.007)  (0.018)  (0.005)  (0.013) 
 
Above median density  0.044**  -0.070**  -0.040**  0.047** 
of large hospitals  (0.006)  (0.014)  (0.004)  (0.010) 
 
Above median density   0.029**  0.088**  0.013**  -0.083** 
of teaching hospitals  (0.006)  (0.015)  (0.005)  (0.011) 
 
Above median density  0.018**  0.001  0.003  -0.015 
of system hospitals  (0.005)  (0.013)  (0.004)  (0.010) 
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